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Notes
REHABILITATING BIOETHICS:
RECONTEXTUALIZING IN VITRO
FERTILIZATION OUTSIDE CONTRACTUAL
AUTONOMY
OLIVIA LIN
INTRODUCTION
As in vitro fertilization (IVF) and other reproductive
technologies become increasingly prevalent, the legal and bioethical
issues that inevitably accompany these new technologies are
outpacing both legislative and judicial responses.1 Thus far,
legislatures hesitant to address the ethical uncertainties in IVF have
been slow to adopt clear guidelines regarding the disposition of the
frozen preembryos2 that remain after an IVF procedure.3 As a result,

Copyright © 2004 by Olivia Lin.
1. See F. Barrett Faulkner, Note, Applying Old Law to New Births: Protecting the Interests
of Children Born Through New Reproductive Technology, 2 J. HIGH TECH. L. 27, 27 (2003):
In most states, the legislature has been slow in resolving the conflicts between old
laws and new reproductive technologies. Courts in many of these states have
attempted to find a set of rules for determining parentage of children born through
new technology, using statutes adopted at a time when legislatures could not have
anticipated such births.
2. Although the relevant case law uses the terms “pre-zygote” and “preembryo”
interchangeably, John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal
Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 CAL. L. REV. 939, 952 n.45 (1986), barring direct
quotation, this Note will rely solely on the term “preembryo.” A preembryo is the term for a
zygote, or fertilized egg, that has not been implanted (for development into the embryo proper)
into the uterus; the preembryo is the category for the first cell stage at which zygotes may be
cryopreserved in the IVF process. Susan L. Crockin, “What Is an Embryo?”: A Legal
Perspective, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1177, 1178–80 (2004).
3. There is a dearth of legislation regarding the disposition of frozen preembryos. As of
this writing, only three states have enacted relevant legislation. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17
(West 1997) (“A commissioning couple and the treating physician shall enter into a written
agreement that provides for the disposition of the commissioning couple’s eggs, sperm, and
preembryos in the event of a divorce, the death of a spouse, or any other unforeseen
circumstance.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:124 (West 2000) (providing that the preembryo must
be considered a “juridical person”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:15 (2001) (“No preembryo
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courts have been left to themselves to determine the best response
when a divorce subsequent to IVF generates dispute over the
4
disposition of remaining preembryos, when one of the parties to IVF
argues against the validity of signed consent forms,5 or when public
policy appears to argue against forcing donors to become parents
6
against their will. The disposition of frozen embryos implicates a
variety of legal issues, and any fruitful consideration of these issues
must operate alongside an analysis of contemporary bioethics. This
Note proposes that the bioethical concerns intrinsic to IVF
cryopreservation of preembryos militate against a traditional contract
approach that turns on personal autonomy and freedom of contract.
Drawing upon contemporary bioethics and theological discourse,
this Note suggests that the unique relationships resulting from the
IVF process preclude the use of classical, contractual frameworks
privileging individual autonomy. An alternative, teleological
framework can recontextualize IVF within contract theory in a
manner that better accounts for the intersection of IVF and the
bioethical concerns that IVF necessarily implicates.
Under contemporary case law, contracts are often interpreted
with an eye toward preserving individual autonomy.7 By contrast, a
teleological approach to contracts would favor for enforcement those
contracts that successfully achieved the original telos, or purpose,
underlying the given contract: in the case of IVF procedures, the
development of a parent-child relationship. Ultimately, this Note
argues that this underlying purpose radically informs the
interpretation of contracts concerning preembryo disposition. Given
this new hermeneutic, contract interpretation would be more likely to
produce results consistent with both the intent of the parties at the
time that the contract was formed and the principles of bioethics.
Part I of this Note describes the IVF procedure, focusing on
those elements at the center of contemporary legal battles. In large
part, the legal disputes concern the disposition of the cryopreserved
preembryos that remain after the conclusion of the IVF process. In

shall be maintained ex utero in the noncryo-preserved state beyond 14 days post-fertilization
development.”).
4. E.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
5. E.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y.
1998); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).
6. E.g., J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
7. See infra notes 101–13 and accompanying text.
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discussing these foundational issues, Part I also examines how the
confusion surrounding the legal and ontological status of preembryos
influences IVF litigation.
Subsequently, Part II examines the relevant case law to
demonstrate the existing disconnect between contemporary bioethical
issues and legal responses. Although only five state courts have ruled
on the disposition of cryopreserved embryos, the resulting opinions
illustrate the complex questions that often arise in such cases:
whether preembryos are persons, property, or neither; which party
should have decisional authority over the remaining preembryos;
whether written consent forms pertaining to disposition should be
enforced; the extent to which public policy issues should inform the
legal discourse concerning IVF; and, finally, the degree to which party
intent should be a factor in contract interpretation. Although the
state courts reached different conclusions regarding preembryo
disposition, for the most part their discourse framed the contractual
analysis regarding IVF contract agreements around the language of
individual autonomy prevalent in contemporary contract theory.
After exploring the relevant legal concerns, Part III navigates the
current theological and bioethical terrain as it pertains to IVF; in
particular, this discussion considers the different constructs of
personhood and parental relationships at issue in new reproductive
technologies. Currently, a high premium on individual autonomy
generates a theory of contract that may neglect to account for the
relationships central to the IVF process. As an alternative, this Note
contends that both theological and bioethical perspectives support a
teleological framework for IVF litigation that does not require
dismissing either individual autonomy or communitarian values. This
teleological perspective would allow for the implementation of new
policies, including embryo adoption and legislated limits on embryo
cryopreservation.
I. BACKGROUND ON IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
With the 1978 birth of Louise Brown, the first child conceived
outside a woman’s body,8 the reproductive landscape changed
dramatically. Conventional notions of conception and childbirth gave
way to the possibility of long-term gamete and embryo

8. Janet L. Dolgin, Embryonic Discourse: Abortion, Stem Cells, and Cloning, 31 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 101, 106 (2003).
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cryopreservation, surrogate motherhood, and even posthumous
9
reproduction. In particular, the development of reproductive
technologies such as IVF provided a solution for infertile couples who
10
sought a “genetic, biological connection” with their children.
Although society’s premium on genetically related offspring may
11
prompt criticism from academics, reproductive procedures such as
IVF are increasingly popular and, each year, Americans spend over
one billion dollars on medical and surgical fertility procedures.12 At
the same time, the science underlying these procedures is gradually
13
eroding traditional ways of understanding when life begins,
personality develops,14 and the parent-child bond forms.15
9. See id. at 107 (“[T]he presumed biological anchors through which families were once
understood are being replaced with a variety of alternative truths about human reproduction.”).
10. Paula Walter, His, Hers, or Theirs—Custody, Control, and Contracts: Allocating
Decisional Authority over Frozen Embryos, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 937, 937 (1999).
11. Leslie Bender, Professor of Law and Women’s Studies at Syracuse University, argues
that a construction of parenthood based purely on a genetic relationship (“genetic
essentialism”) ignores the formative, nonbiological aspects of human personality. See Leslie
Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies: ARTs, Mistakes, Sex, Race, &
Law, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 4 (2003) (“[Genetic essentialism] ignores the ways our cells
and environments interrelate, the ways our physiological system functions as a whole organism,
and the ways our minds and hearts affect our being.”).
12. Daniel I. Steinberg, Note, Divergent Conceptions: Procreational Rights and Disputes
over the Fate of Frozen Embryos, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 315, 317 (1998).
13. The tension in determining when life begins is most evident in abortion debates. See,
e.g., Donald Hope, The Hand as Emblem of Human Identity: A Solution to the Abortion
Controversy Based on Science and Reason, 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 205, 206 (2001) (“The pro-choice
arguments are most persuasive when referring to the early, embryonic, stages of development,
but are much less convincing when applied to fetal life. Conversely, pro-life reasoning applies
most forcefully to fetuses, but runs into serious difficulty when applied to embryonic life.”).
14. See id. at 207:
While some claim that human individuality begins at conception, the scientific facts
do not support this assertion . . . . After the fertilized egg’s first divisions, there is the
possibility of the splitting of one embryo into two or more separate individuals. There
is also the possibility of the merging of two distinct embryos with different genotypes
into one individual. These phenomena call into question the entire notion of
individuality at this early cellular level of development.
(footnote omitted).
15. See Dolgin, supra note 8, at 107 (“As a result of [developments in reproductive
technologies], biological maternity has been separated into two different aspects (gestational
and genetic) . . . and the presumed biological anchors through which families were once
understood are being replaced with a variety of alternative truths about human reproduction.”).
Embryo adoption, one of the newest developments in family law, further illustrates the
potential for evolution in the parent-child relationship. See Olga Batsedis, Note, Embryo
Adoption: A Science Fiction or an Alternative to Traditional Adoption?, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 565,
572 (2003) (“Through embryo adoption, infertile couples can now experience the miracle of
birth as well as the growth process inside the mother’s womb [of a genetically unrelated
child].”).
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The science of the IVF procedure begins when doctors use
hormonal stimulation to cause a woman’s ovaries to produce multiple
16
eggs. Subsequently, these eggs are removed to a petri dish, where
they are fertilized with sperm.17 Fertilization results in preembryos,
which are then transferred to the uterus through a cervical catheter.18
Despite the awkwardness of the term “preembryo,” the label is
accurate because, at this point, the collection of cells constituting the
preembryo has not undergone sufficient differentiation to form what
19
will later be termed the embryo. To result in a successful pregnancy,
the preembryo must be implanted into the uterine lining.20 Although
it is customary for a doctor to retrieve ten or more eggs during the
process of hormone stimulation, no more than three or four
preembryos are transferred to a uterus at any given time because of
the increased risk of multiple pregnancies.21 Much of the legal
controversy, then, centers around the legal and ontological status of
the
preembryos
remaining
after
implantation.
Through
cryopreservation, a technique that allows for the indefinite
preservation of preembryos in liquid nitrogen, remaining preembryos
can be set aside for subsequent implantation attempts, disposal, or
research.22 If clinics used hormonal stimulation to retrieve only the
number of eggs intended for implantation, IVF would be somewhat
less controversial. However, this method seems unlikely; because
most couples must undergo several IVF cycles before a successful
pregnancy, cryopreservation presents an economically efficient means
of avoiding subsequent, costly ovarian stimulation and egg retrieval.23

16. Walter, supra note 10, at 938.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Am. Fertility Soc’y Ethics Comm., Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive
Technologies, 53 FERTILITY & STERILITY 15S, 31S–32S (1990):
[T]he first cellular differentiation of the new generation [of cells] relates to
physiologic interaction with the mother, rather than to the establishment of the
embryo itself. It is for this reason that it is appropriate to refer to the developing
entity up to this point as a preembryo, rather than an embryo.
(emphasis omitted) (quoted in Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tenn. 1992)).
20. Walter, supra note 10, at 938.
21. Karissa Hostrup Windsor, Note, Disposition of Cryopreserved Preembryos After
Divorce, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1005 (2003).
22. Id.
23. See J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 709 (N.J. 2001) (“Cryopreservation of unused
preembryos reduces, and may eliminate, the need for further ovarian stimulation and egg
retrieval, thereby reducing the medical risks and costs associated with both the hormone
regimen and the surgical removal of egg cells from the woman’s body.”); Suchitra Jittaun
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The disposition of unused preembryos does not occur wholly
without guidance. IVF clinics that offer to use cryopreserved
preembryos for later implantations often enter into formal, written
24
Typically, these written
agreements with infertile couples.
agreements offer couples several options with regard to the
25
disposition of any remaining preembryos. Most often, these options
include reserving the preserved preembryos for future implantation,
destruction of the preembryos, donation to a different couple, or
donation to the IVF clinic for research purposes.26 Clinic agreements
may also provide that the death of a party, divorce, refusal to remain
in an IVF program, or termination of an agreement will trigger a
given option.27 Although these contractual constructs appear
relatively transparent, substantial legal confusion remains because of
IVF’s implications for several charged bioethical issues.28
II. STATE SUPREME COURT CASE LAW
RELATING TO IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
Although relevant case law is sparse, the five cases discussed in
this Part illustrate the diversity of judicial responses to the questions
surrounding the disposition of remaining cryopreserved preembryos.
The discussion of these cases emphasizes each state court’s approach
to the question of IVF contract interpretation.29 Although other

Satpathi, Comment, Gliding over Treacherous Ice: Fulfillment and Responsibility in the New
Reproductive Era; Why Contractual Ordering Is Appropriate, 18 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 55,
58 (1999) (“IVF is a costly and draining procedure. The cost of the numerous rounds usually
required in order to achieve a successful pregnancy can be upwards of $40,000.”).
24. Walter, supra note 10, at 938.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Michael T. Morley et al., Developments in Law and Policy: Emerging Issues in
Family Law, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 172 (2003) (“Courts have consistently refused to
enforce contracts . . . that would result in one party becoming a parent against his or her will.”).
29. Because state courts have largely viewed the problem of preembryo disposition
through a contractual lens, this Note does not consider an earlier case, York v. Jones, 717 F.
Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989), which is the sole case to frame the relationship between the parties
to an IVF agreement and their preembryos as a property issue. In that case, the court found:
“[T]he inference to be drawn from these provisions of the Cryopreservation Agreement is that
the defendants fully recognize plaintiffs’ property rights in the pre-zygote and have limited their
rights as bailee to exercise dominion and control over the pre-zygote.” Id. at 426–27.
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30
and public policy
factors, such as the right to privacy
31
considerations, often figured in the courts’ decisionmaking
processes, the courts generally focused on contract interpretation. For
that reason, the balance of this Note focuses on this area of law.

A. Davis v. Davis: A Constitutional Inquiry
Although by 1992 IVF was already prominent in the United
States, the Supreme Court of Tennessee was the first to address the
contractual questions concerning the disposition of frozen
preembryos.32 The court’s landmark case, Davis v. Davis,33 illustrates
the difficulties generated when courts grapple with the legal status of
preembryos in concert with the often complex relationships among
parties to IVF.34 In Davis, the court determined custody of frozen
preembryos from a married couple’s IVF procedure after the couple
had divorced. The couple involved, Mary Sue Davis and her exhusband Junior Lewis Davis, had cryopreserved seven preembryos
35
after six unsuccessful attempts at IVF. Two facts were central to the
Davis court’s analysis: first, when signing up for the IVF procedure,
the Davises had not executed a written agreement specifying what
should be done with the remaining preembryos after the
cryopreservation process;36 second, no Tennessee statute governing
such disposition had existed at the time, and none had been enacted
37
since. As a result of this ambiguous legal landscape, the seven

30. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600 (Tenn. 1992) (“Here, the specific individual
freedom in dispute is the right to procreate. . . . We hold that the right of procreation is a vital
part of an individual’s right to privacy.”).
31. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000) (“We derive from existing State
laws and judicial precedent a public policy in this Commonwealth that individuals shall not be
compelled to enter into intimate family relationships, and that the law shall not be used as a
mechanism for forcing such relationships when they are not desired.”).
32. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590 (“Despite the fact that over 5,000 IVF babies have been
born in this country and the fact that some 20,000 or more ‘frozen embryos’ remain in storage,
there are apparently very few other litigated cases involving the disputed disposition of
untransferred ‘frozen embryos’ . . . .”).
33. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
34. See id. at 594 (“One of the fundamental issues the inquiry poses is whether the
preembryos in this case should be considered ‘persons’ or ‘property’ in the contemplation of the
law.”).
35. Id. at 589, 591.
36. Id. at 590.
37. Id.
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unused preembryos became the sole subject of legal dispute in an
38
otherwise uncomplicated divorce proceeding.
In an opinion awarding custody of the preembryos to Junior
Davis,39 the court delineated various theories by which disposition
could be settled, all deriving from disparate views concerning the
nature of preembryos (i.e., whether a preembryo should be allocated
“person” or “property” status) or the degree to which the personal
autonomy of either party to the IVF procedure should be
considered.40 The court considered several legal theories; one theory
would have required that gamete providers use all preembryos
obtained during IVF, whereas another theory would have required
that any remaining preembryos be discarded.41 Still another theory
would have given female gamete providers control over the
preembryos in all cases because of females’ “greater physical and
emotional contribution to the IVF process.”42 Alternatively, the court
considered two “implied contract” theories: one inferring that
participation in IVF granted disposition authority to the IVF clinic,
and one inferring that both parties to IVF had made an “irrevocable
commitment to reproduction,” and that, therefore, any remaining
preembryos must be transferred either to the female provider or to a
viable third party.43
44
Ultimately, rejecting the “personhood” of the preembryo, the
Davis court adopted a middle-of-the-road approach regarding the
45
status of preembryos and personal autonomy. First, the court
concluded that the preembryos were “not, strictly speaking, either

38. Id. at 592.
39. Id. at 604.
40. See id. at 590 (“[M]edical-legal scholars and ethicists have proposed various models for
the disposition of ‘frozen embryos’ when unanticipated contingencies arise, such as divorce,
death of one or both of the parties, financial reversals, or simple disenchantment with the IVF
process.”).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 590–91.
44. Id. at 594–97.
45. See id. at 591:
As appealing as [the possibility of adopting a bright-line test] might seem, we
conclude that given the relevant principles of constitutional law, the existing public
policy of Tennessee with regard to unborn life, the current state of scientific
knowledge giving rise to the emerging reproductive technologies, and the ethical
considerations that have developed in response to that scientific knowledge, there can
be no easy answer to the question we now face.
(emphasis added).
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‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occup[ied] an interim category that
entitle[d] them to special respect because of their potential for human
46
47
life.” Second, in weighing the right to procreative autonomy, the
court focused on whether “the parties [would] become parents” and
concluded that “the answer to this dilemma turn[ed] on the parties’
exercise of their constitutional right to privacy.”48 Significantly, noting
that a right to privacy, or personal autonomy, “[was] deeply
embedded in the Tennessee Constitution,”49 the court concluded that
the decisionmaking authority remains with the gamete providers
rather than with the court or the IVF clinic, “at least to the extent that
the providers’ decisions had an impact upon their individual
50
reproductive status.” Ultimately, the Davis court held that Junior’s
interest in avoiding parenthood outweighed Mary Sue’s interest in
donating the embryos.51 Although the Davis court used a balancing
test in determining the disposition of the remaining preembryos, the
court suggested that an agreement pertaining to the disposition of
remaining preembryos in the event of unforeseen events “should be
52
presumed valid and should be enforced.”
B. Kass v. Kass: Written Agreements Enforced
In 1998, six years after the Davis decision, the New York Court
of Appeals examined the question of preembryo disposition in Kass
v. Kass.53 There, prior to IVF procedures, Maureen and Steve Kass
signed consent forms detailing what should be done with the
remaining preembryos.54 After the couple divorced, Maureen sought

46. Id. at 597.
47. “[T]he right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of equal
significance—the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation.” Id. at 601.
48. Id. at 598.
49. Id. at 599.
50. Id. at 602.
51. Id. at 604. After the lower court decisions, Mary Sue decided against using the
preembryos herself but, rather, sought the right to donate them to another couple. Id. at 590.
52. Id. at 597.
53. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
54. In relevant part, the consent forms indicated:
We have the principal responsibility to decide the disposition of our frozen prezygotes. Our frozen pre-zygotes will not be released from storage for any purpose
without the written consent of both of us . . . . In the event of divorce, we understand
that legal ownership of any stored pre-zygotes must be determined in a property
settlement and will be released as directed by order of a court of competent
jurisdiction.
Id. at 176. The Kasses also signed a “Statement of Disposition” that indicated in relevant part:
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custody of five cryopreserved preembryos, whereas her ex-husband
argued that the couple had explicitly consented to donate the
55
preembryos to the IVF program for research purposes. In analyzing
56
the relevant consent forms, the Kass court followed Davis dicta and
held that the prior written agreement should be enforced:
“Agreements between progenitors, or gamete donors, regarding
disposition of their pre-zygotes should generally be presumed valid
and binding, and enforced in any dispute between them.”57
Unlike the Davis court, which devoted a substantial portion of its
opinion to the question of the legal (and ontological) status of the
preembryo, the Kass court did not broach that question, observing
that preembryos are not constitutionally recognized as “persons.”58
The court further noted that the disposition of preembryos “does not
implicate a woman’s right of privacy or bodily integrity in the area of
reproductive choice.”59 Because the Kasses had signed consent forms
regarding preembryo disposition, the Kass court was able to sidestep
the larger ontological issues and focus on how to allocate the
authority over disposition.60
Ultimately, the New York Court of Appeals held that the written
consent forms signed by the Kasses required that the preembryos be
61
donated to the IVF program for research. In reaching that
conclusion, the court not only encouraged future IVF parties to
“think through possible contingencies and carefully specify their
wishes [regarding preembryo disposition] in writing,”62 but also
framed the importance of the contract between the IVF clinic and the

In the event that we no longer wish to initiate a pregnancy or are unable to make a
decision regarding the disposition of our stored, frozen pre-zygotes . . . :
...
. . . Our frozen pre-zygotes may be examined by the IVF Program for biological
studies and be disposed of by the IVF Program for approved research investigation as
determined by the IVF Program . . . .
Id. at 176–77.
55. Id. at 177.
56. See supra note 54.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180.
Id. at 179 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 180.
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63
Kasses as an expression of joint intent. In affirming the
enforceability of the written consent forms, the Kass decision
illustrates the effect of giving primacy to the notion of freedom of
contract.64

C. A.Z. v. B.Z.: Written Agreements Not Enforced
Highlighting the diverse approaches within the relevant case law,
65
in the 2000 decision A.Z. v. B.Z., the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts refused to enforce a consent form signed by an IVF
clinic and the parties to an IVF procedure.66 As in prior cases, the
couple involved had separated subsequent to IVF treatments that had
67
produced cryopreserved embryos. Moreover, as with the Kasses, the
couple had signed a consent form (required by the clinic) providing
that, in the event of separation, the wife would retain control of the
preembryos for her future implantation.68 Following the lead of the
Kass court, the A.Z. court did not discuss the status of the preembryo;
rather, the opinion turned on issues of freedom of contract and public
policy.69
Despite acknowledging that the consent forms contained legal
70
ambiguities, the court ultimately concluded that, “even had the
husband and the wife entered into an unambiguous agreement

63. See id. at 181 (“[T]he informed consents signed by the parties unequivocally manifest
their mutual intention that in the present circumstances the pre-zygotes be donated for research
to the IVF program.” (emphases added)).
64. See id. at 182 (“These parties having clearly manifested their intention, the law will
honor it.”).
65. 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
66. Id. at 1059.
67. Id. at 1053.
68. Id. at 1054. A.Z. v. B.Z. has the distinction of being the first reported case to deal with a
contract purporting to give any remaining preembryos to one of the donors for future
implantation. Id. at 1056.
69. See id. at 1058 (“It is well-established that courts will not enforce contracts that violate
public policy.”).
70. The consent form contained the undefined phrase “[s]hould we become separated.” Id.
at 1057. Because the custody dispute arose in the context of a divorce, not a separation, the A.Z.
court ultimately could not conclude that the consent form was intended to govern in the
particular circumstances. Id. Moreover, the court held that the consent form could not represent
the husband’s “true intention” regarding preembryo disposition because, when he signed the
consent form, it was still blank; only after he signed did the wife fill in the blank to reserve the
embryos for her own implantation. Id. Ultimately, the court concluded that the consent form
was “legally insufficient in several important respects” and did not reach the “minimum level of
completeness” required for enforcement. Id.
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between themselves regarding the disposition of the frozen
preembryos,” public policy, at times, must trump the freedom of
71
contract. The public policy value given priority was society’s
reluctance to compel donors to become genetic parents against their
will.72 According to the A.Z. court, this policy derived from the
principle that “respect for liberty and privacy” required that an
individual have the freedom to decide whether to enter into a family
relationship.73
D. J.B. v. M.B.: Diminishing the Role of Contract
In August 2001, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided J.B. v.
74
M.B., which concerned the enforceability of a signed consent form
stipulating that unused preembryos would be donated to the IVF
clinic in the event of divorce, unless the court ordering the divorce
specified some other disposition.75 As in A.Z., J.B and M.B. signed a
consent form prior to their IVF procedure,76 but this couple
successfully conceived a daughter, who was born shortly before the
77
couple separated. When J.B. filed a divorce complaint in which she
sought a court order to have the eight remaining frozen embryos
discarded, M.B. counterclaimed, seeking to compel J.B. to allow the
donation of the preembryos to another couple.78
Noteworthy in the court’s contractual analysis was its focus on
public policy issues; the court ultimately suggested that the policy of
protecting individuals from unwanted family responsibilities could
79
supersede the enforcement of a contract. After determining that it
could enforce the court order clause in the consent form, the J.B.
court chose to use the same balancing of interests approach taken in

71. Id. at 1057–58.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1059.
74. 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
75. Id. at 710. In relevant part, the consent form stated: “The control and disposition of the
embryos belongs to the Patient and her Partner. . . . I, J.B. (patient), and M.B. (partner), agree
that all control, direction, and ownership of our tissues will be relinquished to the IVF Program
under . . . [a] dissolution of our marriage by court order . . . .” Id.
76. Id. at 709–10.
77. Id. at 710.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 719 (“The public policy concerns that underlie limitations on contracts
involving family relationships are protected by permitting either party to object at a later date to
provisions specifying a disposition of preembryos that that party no longer accepts.”).
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80
Davis. Ultimately, the court held that prohibiting M.B. from
donating the preembryos would neither deny nor diminish his right to
81
procreate. By contrast, authorizing donation would violate J.B.’s
right not to procreate, even though she would not be raising the
prospective child herself.82
The J.B. opinion attempted to outline some considerations for
future consent agreements, noting that they “should be written in
plain language,” that parties should have the opportunity to review
the terms with a clinic representative prior to execution, and that, as a
general principle of contract law, parties should not sign blank
agreements.83 However, adding greatly to the confusion of the
relevant case law, the court opined that it would enforce such
contracts only if both parties had the right to change their minds.84
This final caveat diminishes the authoritative weight of IVF contracts.

E. Litowitz v. Litowitz: Enforcing Contracts as Emblematic of Party
Intent
85

Most recently, in Litowitz v. Litowitz, the Washington Supreme
Court enforced an IVF cryopreservation contract stipulating that, if a
husband and wife could not reach a mutual agreement regarding
preembryo disposition, the couple would submit the question to the
86
court. The court enforced the Litowitz contract, in which the parties
agreed to abide by the court’s instructions if they could not reach a
consensus concerning the disposition of the preembryos.87 David
Litowitz wanted to put the remaining preembryos up for adoption,
whereas Becky Litowitz wished to implant the preembryos in a
surrogate mother and subsequently raise the resulting children as her
88
own.
As stipulated by the contract, because the couple disagreed on
the proper disposition of the frozen preembryos, the court took the
80. Id. at 716; see supra notes 44–52 and accompanying text.
81. Davis, 783 A.2d at 717.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 719.
84. See id. (“[T]he better rule . . . is to enforce agreements entered into at the time in vitro
fertilization is begun, subject to the right of either party to change his or her mind about
disposition up to the point of use or destruction of any stored preembryos.”).
85. 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).
86. Id. at 270–71.
87. Id. at 271.
88. Id.
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responsibility of providing instructions regarding the disposition. In
reaching its conclusion regarding the contractual issues, the Litowitz
90
court focused on the parties’ intent to thaw the preembryos; the
contract required that the remaining preembryos be “thawed but not
allowed to undergo further development” if the preembryos
remained in cryopreservation for more than five years.91
Although only David Litowitz was a gamete provider, the court
found that “he ha[d] no greater contractual right to the eggs” than
92
Becky Litowitz, the intended mother. Despite this acknowledgment
of maternal and paternal rights, the Litowitz court sidestepped a
more precise determination of the ontological status of the contested
preembyros, declaring that the question of whether the preembryos
constituted children was “not a logical or relevant inquiry.”93 The
Supreme Court later denied Becky Litowitz’s petition for a writ of
certiorari,
perpetuating
the
legal
confusion
surrounding
cryopreserved preembryos. 94
III. A TELEOLOGICAL APPROACH TO IVF CONTRACT
INTERPRETATION
As the relevant case law demonstrates,95 there is little analytical
intersection between the dominant legal theories underlying
preembryo disposition and the bioethical theories concerning
personhood and personal autonomy.96 Although it may seem intuitive
that the legal issues raised by assisted reproductive technologies
97
necessarily implicate the vocabulary of bioethics, the courts have

89. Id. at 268.
90. See id. (“Contract interpretation must be based on the intent of the parties as reflected
in their agreement.”).
91. Id. at 264.
92. Id. at 268.
93. Id. at 269.
94. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 537 U.S. 1191 (2003).
95. See supra Part II.
96. The question of control is at the center of several bioethical debates, including
embryonic stem cell research and the destruction of cryopreserved preembryos. However, the
two debates often elicit dissimilar popular reactions. See Dolgin, supra note 8, at 108 (“[I]n the
main, embryos produced in the context of infertility treatment have not engendered the sort of
intense controversy about the status and rights of the embryo that has surrounded discussion of
therapeutic cloning and embryonic stem cell research.”).
97. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 11, at 6 (“For the last two decades, our judicial system has
trailed woefully behind the complex bioethical dilemmas that accompany the rapid advances in
biotechnology, biomedicine, and assisted reproductive technologies.”); John A. Robertson,
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moved toward an analytical bifurcation of the two issues. Indeed, the
Litowitz court declared that the status of the preembryo was not even
98
a “logical or relevant inquiry.” Other courts have avoided bioethical
issues entirely. For people who continue to feel that the legal
questions surrounding IVF cryopreservation and other assisted
reproductive technologies cannot avoid a dialogue with bioethics,99
the current legal frameworks are untenable.
This Part illustrates that it is imperative for contemporary
bioethics to inform the legal dialogue surrounding IVF
cryopreservation. A legal response that relies primarily upon classical,
100
autonomy-oriented contract law frameworks critically ignores the
unique bioethical concerns implicated by the IVF process. However,
a wholesale rejection of the contractual framework is unnecessary.
Rather, contemporary scholars in both bioethical and theological
discourse find analytical benefits in an alternative, teleological
approach to contractual interpretation. This teleological approach
interprets the IVF process through its purpose of developing a
“Paying the Alligator”: Precommitment in Law, Bioethics, and Constitutions, 81 TEX. L. REV.
1729, 1737 (2003) (“Bioethics concerns the ethics, norms, and laws that arise out of medical
practice and innovation and often involves questions that involve the extension or creation of
life.”).
98. Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 269.
99. See STANLEY HAUERWAS, Salvation and Health: Why Medicine Needs the Church, in
SUFFERING PRESENCE: THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON MEDICINE, THE MENTALLY
HANDICAPPED, AND THE CHURCH 63, 72 (1986):
[W]e are currently trying to do the impossible—namely, “build a civilization with an
agreed civil tradition and [in] the absence of a moral consensus.” This makes the
practice of medicine even more morally challenging, since it is by no means clear how
one can sustain a non-arbitrary medicine in a genuinely morally pluralistic society.
(quoting Paul Ramsey, The Nature of Medical Ethics, in THE TEACHING OF MEDICAL ETHICS
14, 15 (Robert M. Veatch et al. eds., 1973) (alteration in original)); Oliver O’Donovan, Again:
Who Is a Person?, in ABORTION AND THE SANCTITY OF HUMAN LIFE 125 (J.H. Channer ed.,
1985) (discussing the multifarious bioethical issues arising from the newest reproductive
technologies).
100. See Chad McCracken, Note, Hegel and the Autonomy of Contract Law, 77 TEX. L. REV.
719, 720–21 (1999) (“[C]ontract law as classically conceived was both corollary to and bulwark
of liberal individualism.”); id. at 730 (noting that in contract law, the “actual, subjective choice
of the individual” is viewed as “crucial for autonomy and thus deserving of protection”).
Although not represented in the current debates over the disposition of cryopreserved
preembryos, some scholars suggest that legal developments such as the doctrines of
unconscionability and promissory estoppel evidence the movement of contract law away from
classical ties to autonomy. See, e.g., Julian S. Lim, Comment, Tongue-Tied in the Market: The
Relevance of Contract Law to Racial-Language Minorities, 91 CAL. L. REV. 579, 605 (2003)
(“Unconscionability is a fairly modern doctrinal development in contract law, typifying contract
law’s shift away from a classical theory of contracts based on freedom of contract and autonomy
rationales.”).
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parent-child relationship. Ultimately, this approach points toward
concrete, alternative policies.
A. Traditional Contract Theory and the Premium on Personal
Autonomy
The contractual interpretation driving the most recent state court
rulings101 places a premium on an issue of paramount importance to
bioethicists: personal autonomy. For both contract law and
reproductive bioethics, a critical concern is whether there is a moral
or ontological imperative to protect individual autonomy.102 Whereas
the bioethical debate revolves around the extent to which individuals
103
can or should control the reproductive process, contract law, at its
core, involves the enforceability of legal restraints on personal
104
autonomy. The dominant framework for contractual interpretation
turns on the intent of the parties.105 Not surprisingly, this emphasis on
individual choice places a “virtual veto power” in the hands of parties

101. See Dolgin, supra note 8, at 108 (“For the most part, courts, entertaining disputes about
frozen embryos, have relied on contractual agreements to resolve such disputes, or in the
absence of such agreements, on the comparative interests of the parties.” (footnote omitted)).
102. See Bernadette Tobin, Did You Think About Buying Her a Cat? Some Reflections on
the Concept of Autonomy, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 417, 418 (1995) (observing that,
in the bioethical debate over euthanasia, some commentators “believe that the capacity to live
autonomously is the crucial mark of moral maturity and . . . believe that respect for the
autonomous individual signifies respect for that person as a human being”).
103. See, e.g., William W. Bassett, Private Religious Hospitals: Limitations upon
Autonomous Moral Choices in Reproductive Medicine, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
455, 506 (2001) (“Emphasis upon personal autonomy, freedom of conscience, and the
importance of the family as the focal point of procreation formed the larger context for
theological reflection upon the bioethics of reproductive medicine.”); Joseph Fletcher,
Technological Devices in Medical Care, in ON MORAL MEDICINE: THEOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 277, 279 (Stephen E. Lammers & Allen Verhey eds., 1998)
(“[M]orally, the heart of the matter [concerning assisted reproductive technologies] is control.
The question is whether human beings may choose or make the conditions of life, health, and
death.” (emphasis added)).
104. See, e.g., David Frisch, Contractual Choice of Law and the Prudential Foundations of
Appellate Review, 56 VAND. L. REV. 57, 58 (2003) (“The principle of ‘freedom of contract’ . . .
rests on the belief that respect for personal autonomy is a necessary complement to both the
liberal political state and a free-market economy.”); Jeanne L. Shroeder, Some Realism About
Legal Surrealism, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 509 (1996) (“Under traditional liberal analysis,
in order to further personal autonomy, contract law should be subjective, in that the parties
should be able freely to bind themselves by contract however they want. Autonomy, however,
also demands that no one be bound without her consent.”).
105. See, e.g., Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 268 (Wash. 2002) (“Contract interpretation
must be based on the intent of the parties as reflected in their agreement.”).
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106
who want to avoid reproduction. Although this form of contractual
interpretation drives the case law, there remains a confusing diversity
of approaches to enforcing the written agreements: the contract, if
present, is sometimes enforced,107 sometimes not enforced if public
policy suggests otherwise,108 or, most strangely, sometimes enforced
until the point when any given party to the contract reneges
109
consent.
Although the cases described in Part II reached different
conclusions regarding preembryo disposition, the individualism
characterizing the respective courts’ discussions of the IVF
agreements derives from a subjective or will theory of contract law,
which proposes that contracts are enforceable only if there has been a
110
“meeting of the minds” between the parties. In other words, if
individual autonomy reigns, contractual agreements that do not
111
reflect the subjective agreement of the parties are moot. When the
subjective theory of contract, or will theory, is the prevailing lens
through which the IVF decision is construed, there is no reason for an
inquiry into either the ontological or teleological worth of frozen
preembryos.112

106. See Morley et al., supra note 28, at 174:
The practical effect of [the current case law] approach is that it gives the individual
opposed to implantation a virtual veto power, because the zygotes must stay
cryopreserved until the couple reaches a resolution; this is exactly what happens when
a court refuses to enforce a contract over the objection of a party seeking to avoid
reproduction.
107. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998) (“Agreements between progenitors,
or gamete donors, regarding disposition of their pre-zygotes should generally be presumed valid
and binding, and enforced in any dispute between them.”); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597
(Tenn. 1992) (finding that a written agreement providing for the disposition of cryopreserved
preembryos in the event of unforeseen circumstances “should be presumed valid and should be
enforced”).
108. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Mass. 2000) (“[E]ven had the husband and the
wife entered into an unambiguous agreement between themselves regarding the disposition of
the frozen preembryos, we would not enforce an agreement . . . . [a]s a matter of public
policy . . . .”).
109. See J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 718–19 (N.J. 2001) (holding that the enforceability of an
agreement depends on either party’s being able to “change his or her mind about disposition”).
110. See Vincent A. Wellman, Conceptions of the Common Law: Reflections on a Theory of
Contract, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 925, 933 (1987) (“[T]he subjective or will theory of contract . . .
urges that contractual liability be imposed because, and only to the extent that, the individual
has voluntarily undertaken such liability.”).
111. McCracken, supra note 100, at 738.
112. See id. at 732 (observing that the will theory of contract would “bar an inquiry into the
purposes of the contracting parties or the objective worth of the things to be exchanged”).

LIN FINAL.DOC

502

6/6/2005 10:37 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:485

The autonomy-based perspective on contract theory becomes
complicated in the arena of IVF procedures because of the unique
bioethical questions that issues of reproduction and family implicate.
At the outset, however, it is crucial to emphasize that no single
bioethical critique can productively reach the diversity of
contemporary bioethical perspectives. This Note therefore focuses on
those voices in bioethics that seek a balance between personal
autonomy and communitarian values.113 As a result, perspectives that
114
place a higher premium on personal autonomy are outside the
scope of this particular discussion.
115
The central bioethical issues here concern the extent to which
116
individual autonomy exists within familial relationships. Much
contemporary debate over the place of autonomy in family
relationships surrounds the use of contractual vocabulary—such as
“rights” terminology—in the concept of family.117 Several recent legal
developments reflect a trend toward interpreting the family as a
collection of autonomous, independent individuals; these
113. See, e.g., Bruce Jennings, Beyond the Harm Principle: From Autonomy to Civic
Responsibility, in MORAL VALUES: THE CHALLENGE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 191,
195 (W. Lawson Taitte ed., 1996) (discussing the moral challenges generated by increasingly
sophisticated biotechnologies and the clash between these moral challenges and society’s
traditional protection of personal autonomy).
114. See, e.g., William M. Sage, Physicians as Advocates, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 1529, 1538 (1999)
(discussing how the extension of the “rights” vocabulary to “matters that previously had been
addressed through professional morality . . . was seductive to physicians[,]” who found deferring
to personal autonomy or public adjudication simpler than “reorient[ing] one’s moral compass”);
Adrienne E. Quinn, Comment, Who Should Make Medical Decisions for Incompetent Adults? A
Critique of RCW 7.70.065, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 573, 574 (1997) (“Personal autonomy, a
principle rooted in Western philosophy, has strongly influenced American law and bioethics.”).
115. This Note’s emphasis on the bioethical nature of this conversation explains its focus on
family relationships in specific as opposed to general contractual relationships. In the main, the
ethical questions stem from the potential of the preembryo to become party to a parent-child
relationship.
116. Professor Janet L. Dolgin suggests that the contemporary discourse on embryonic stem
cell research is the product of a post-Enlightenment reinterpretation of the family. See Dolgin,
supra note 8, at 104 (“[The debate about embryonic stem cells] represents . . . a new debate
about personhood that assumes autonomous individuality even in familial settings.” (emphasis
added)).
117. See Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 337, 347–48 (2002):
By the 1960s and 1970s, the values of the marketplace were being applied to, and
were redefining, the domestic arena. Family members (especially adults within
families) began to understand themselves as autonomous individuals, free to
negotiate the terms of their relationships, and as potentially liberated from traditional
family roles by the possibility of exercising choice at home, as well as at work.
(first emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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118
developments include state provisions for no-fault divorce and the
willingness of courts to recognize and enforce prenuptial agreements
119
that anticipate the possibility of divorce. Likewise, in its family law
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court underwent an analytical shift from
Griswold v. Connecticut,120 in which Justice Douglas described
marriage as a “coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
121
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred,” to Eisenstadt
122
v. Baird, in which Justice Brennan focused on the individual
autonomy of each spouse, noting, “[T]he marital couple is not an
independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an
association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
123
emotional makeup.” Notably, although legal scholarship suggests a
growing protection of adults as autonomous individuals within some
family contexts,124 the role of autonomy becomes much more
ambiguous within the parent-child relationship.
When touching upon legal issues involving parent-child
relationships, courts are conflicted about how principles of personal
125
autonomy should apply to individual family members. By way of
illustration, over the last thirty-five years, the Supreme Court has
126
delivered opinions describing children as autonomous individuals,

118. See Developments in the Law—The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1996, 2089 (2003) (“[N]o-fault divorce centers on respect for individual autonomy––the ability
of parties to make decisions about marriage and divorce free from overwhelming state
control.”).
119. See Dolgin, supra note 8, at 122 n.139 (“A number of the early decisions recognizing
prenuptial agreements in contemplation of divorce justified that step by referring to sociological
changes in the character of families [including the increasing rate of divorce].”).
120. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
121. Id. at 486.
122. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
123. Id. at 453. The Court further noted that the right of privacy includes the right of an
individual, whether married or single, to be free to make autonomous reproductive decisions.
Id.
124. See Dolgin, supra note 8, at 123 (observing that the notion of the family is premised on
“autonomous individuality,” or the concept that family members are “free to negotiate the
terms of familial relationships and to define their sexual and reproductive lives without
reference to the constraints of traditional family life”).
125. See id. at 124 n.152 (“The still unresolved ideological struggle about family in the
United States today focuses not on the relationship between adults within families but on the
dimensions and meaning of the parent-child relationship.”).
126. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (“Students
in school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution.”).
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127
or members of an ambiguous interim
unequal dependents,
128
category. The extent to which the Court confers autonomy within a
129
parent-child relationship is generally dependent on context. The
heightened ambiguity concerning personal autonomy within parentchild jurisprudence illustrates why circumscribing individual
autonomy may become necessary when unrestrained choice produces
unconstructive or even damaging results.130 Therefore, to best
evaluate the role of autonomy in the interpretation of disposition
contracts for cryopreserved preembryos, a more contextual
understanding of the possible parental relationships is necessary.

B. The Need for a Teleological Approach
As a foundational matter, proposing a teleological approach for
contractual interpretation in IVF cases requires discussing the telos of
the contractual agreement.131 Under this approach, the contractual
agreement to undergo IVF cannot be understood apart from the
132
parties’ ultimate goal of generating some type of parent-child

127. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 616–17 (1979) (upholding a state law that allowed
parents voluntarily to commit children into mental institutions).
128. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899–900 (1992) (holding
that a state may require a minor seeking an abortion to obtain parental consent as long as an
adequate judicial bypass procedure is available).
129. Questioning the reach of constitutional jurisprudence that presumes autonomous
individuality in protecting individual rights, Professor Dolgin suggests that family law
inappropriately applies personal autonomy frameworks to the parent-child relationship. See
Dolgin, supra note 8, at 405 (“[American constitutional jurisprudence and its presumption of
autonomous individuality] cannot easily serve groups defined by status [such as children] . . . .
For such groups, legal protection almost inevitably becomes synonymous with paternalism.”).
130. See Merry Jean Chan, Note, The Authorial Parent: An Intellectual Property Model of
Parental Rights, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1186, 1189 (2003) (“Regulating parental rights is necessary to
prevent certain extreme expressive choices with respect to childbearing or childrearing from
undercutting the social goal of regenerating society.”).
131. See Henry Mather, Searching for the Moral Foundations of Contract Law, 47 AM. J.
JURIS. 71, 72 (2002) (“[I]f some social institution or activity has such an end, it would seem that
we should evaluate that institution or activity according to how well it promotes that end.”).
132. The complexity of assisted reproductive technologies has generated new constructions
of parenthood that eclipse a traditional view of parenthood based purely on genetic
relationship. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Uncovering the Rationale for Requiring Infertility
in Surrogacy Arrangements, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 337, 339 (2003) (contrasting genetic
parenthood with surrogate parenthood, in which a surrogate mother agrees to implantation with
a fertilized egg provided by either an intended mother or an egg donor); Faulkner, supra note 1,
at 28 (“With IVF, donors may provide both ova and sperm, so there are potentially four people
with parental interests: the genetic father (sperm donor), the genetic mother (egg donor), the
gestational mother, and the husband of the gestational mother.”).
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133
relationship. Indeed, if the contract privileges the concept of
individual autonomy rather than the parent-child relationship, it fails
to reflect accurately the interdependent relationships implicated
when the contract is enforced.134 Whereas a contractual framework
oriented around autonomy may prove insufficient given the collective
and relational objectives at stake, a teleological framework permits
the desirable predictability of a concrete legal standard while
supporting the uniquely relational concerns at stake in the IVF
process.135 The teleological approach, rather than privileging ideals of
individual autonomy, develops out of natural law theory’s emphasis
on continuity between morality and the law, focusing on the purpose
of a given legal structure.136 An examination of the teleology of IVF
requires engaging the reality of the relationships among the affected

133. See, e.g., Roger H. Taylor, The Fear of Drawing the Line at Cloning, 9 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 379, 398 (2003) (distinguishing between the teleology of IVF and that of genetic
cloning by noting that “[t]he purpose of IVF embryos is to create a new human being” whereas
“the purpose of an embryo cloned for therapeutics is to improve an existing human’s life”); Erik
W. Johnson, Note, Frozen Embryos: Determining Disposition Through Contract, 55 RUTGERS
L. REV. 793, 796 (2003) (“In vitro fertilization has provided patients with a marginal success
rate, but it is typically the last resort of parents who wish to procreate using their own genetic
material.”); Satpathi, supra note 23, at 56 (“The paradigm that determines legal parenthood on
the basis of individual intentions about procreation and parenting, in the context of
reproductive technology, should recognize, encourage, and reinforce individual choices to
nurture children.”); Mario Trespalacios, Comment, Frozen Embryos: Towards an Equitable
Solution, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 803, 827 (1992) (“The main premise of the contract framework
assumes that the biological donors mutually decided to undergo IVF, thereby entering into a
contract, either explicitly or implicitly, with each other to create pre-embryos for the purpose of
implantation, with the ultimate goal of achieving live births.” (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted)).
134. See Roger B. Dworkin, Medical Law and Ethics in the Post-Autonomy Age, 68 IND. L.J.
727, 736 (1993) (“By making the autonomous actor and the ‘lone rights-bearer’ our model for
social thought, we inadvertently disparage and injure those who do not fit the model, ‘the very
young, the severely ill or disabled, the frail elderly, as well as those who care for them.’”
(quoting MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 47, 74 (1991))).
135. Significantly, although contract law has been viewed as a legal structure that
commodifies its subjects by treating them as units of exchange, a teleological approach can
prevent such commodification by highlighting the subjects as ends, not purely as means. See
Sara D. Petersen, Comment, Dealing with Cryopreserved Embryos upon Divorce: A Contractual
Approach Aimed at Preserving Party Expectations, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1065, 1088 (2003) (arguing
that to allow a court to make its own assessment regarding a couple’s preembryos may devalue
embryos in ways that contractual enforcement does not).
136. See Mather, supra note 131, at 72:
Natural law theory is teleological. It evaluates a human artifact, human institution, or
human activity by how well it achieves its proper purpose, its end, its telos . . . . The
end of medicine is health. The end of shipbuilding is a vessel. The end of strategy is
victory.

LIN FINAL.DOC

506

6/6/2005 10:37 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:485
137

parties, thereby altering the legal terrain surrounding IVF contracts.
This Section addresses both the bioethical and theological arguments
that support such a teleological theory of contract.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, courts that choose to address bioethical
issues in the context of IVF litigation generally focus on the
138
personhood (or lack thereof) of the preembryo. The ontological
personhood of the fetus (and now the embryo or preembryo) has
been a baseline assumption of many commentators who view casual
disposition of embryos as morally objectionable.139 The conventional
perspective on the legal and ethical controversies surrounding
assisted reproductive technologies or abortion posits the existence of
two camps: people who view the embryo as a person and people who
deny the embryo any ontological status.140 People who argue for the
personhood of a cryopreserved preembryo often do so because
society traditionally associated personhood with both dignity and the
conferring of legal rights.141

137. See Robert J. Araujo, Abortion, Ethics, and the Common Good: Who Are We? What
Do We Want? How Do We Get There?, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 701, 721 (1993) (“Because we as
individual humans are also social beings whose existence is grounded in relationships with
others, the concept of the telos helps us to understand [our ethical goal] by placing it into a
communal setting.”).
138. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 (N.Y. 1998) (choosing to resolve the dispute
without discussing whether preembryos are deserving of “special respect” as legal persons);
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594 (Tenn. 1992) (observing that a fundamental issue in the
disposition dispute was whether the remaining preembryos should be considered legal
“persons”).
139. See Dolgin, supra note 8, at 118:
[During and after the nineteenth century,] the ontological status of the fetus was one
among a wide set of concerns and assertions publicized by abortion opponents. . . .
Nineteenth-century abortion opponents constructed the notion of the embryo-asperson, but their agenda was grounded in a vision of traditional family life and gender
roles.
140. See Janet Dolgin, The Ideological Context of the Disability Rights Critique: Where
Modernity and Tradition Meet, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 343, 355 (2003) (“For abortion opponents,
assertions about the fetus-as-child have provided the sort of strategic tool that has largely been
lacking in other contexts involving legal responses to adults’ expanded choices, especially about
reproductive matters, within family contexts.”).
141. See Stephen M. Wise, Hardly a Revolution: The Eligibility of Nonhuman Animals for
Dignity-Rights in a Liberal Society, 22 VT. L. REV. 793, 795 (1998) (“[O]nly human beings . . .
and institutions that represent human interests[] have ever been eligible for legal personhood
and therefore legal rights.”). For some commentators, the decision to confer legal rights onto
“persons” is incontrovertibly linked to the notion that autonomous individuals should have legal
rights. See id. at 798 (“Like liberty rights, dignity-rights are almost universally claimed to be
derived from a capacity for autonomy.”).
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A more cogent, bioethically informed approach to the
disposition of cryopreserved preembryos could avoid the current legal
142
wrangling over personhood. In contemporary society, however, the
vocabulary of “personhood” may no longer carry the same
resonance.143 Consequently, bioethicists are now challenging the
adequacy of “personhood” as a useful inquiry for resolving the legal
144
complexities generated by assisted reproductive technologies.
Contemporary bioethical discourse supports a stronger emphasis on
teleology. Many ethicists now suggest that the ethical inquiry
underlying issues such as IVF should depend not on ontological
questions of personhood but, rather, on whether a given choice
damages a relationship.145 From this perspective, resolving the
bioethical tensions surrounding cryopreserved embryos requires not
ontological postulation, but in-depth examination of the prospective
relationship that served as the telos for the initial IVF contract.146

142. See Windsor, supra note 21, at 1007–13 (describing three different approaches to the
legal status of cryopreserved preembryos: the Person Status/Right-to-Life Approach, the
Property Status Approach, and the Special Respect Approach).
143. See Stanley Hauerwas, Must a Patient Be a Person to Be a Patient? Or, My Uncle
Charlie Is Not Much of a Person but He Is Still My Uncle Charlie, 39 CONN. MED. 815, 817
(1975):
[W]e are now in a period when some people no longer think simply because a child is
born to them they need to regard it as their child. We will not solve this kind of
dilemma by trying to say what the doctor can and cannot do in such circumstances in
terms of whether the child can be understood to be a “person” or not.
144. See id. at 815–17 (arguing that most moral decisions have less to do with the ontological
concept of a “person” than with the relationships developed through a given situation);
O’Donovan, supra note 99, at 127 (suggesting a self-described “existentialist anthropology,” by
which society does not “confer[]” personhood by treating an object as a person but rather
“discover[s]” personhood through an object’s relationships with others).
145. See Hauerwas, supra note 143, at 816 (“[T]he reason that we do not use one man for
another or society’s good is not that we violate his ‘person,’ but rather because we have learned
that it is destructive of the trust between us to do so.”). Professor Roger B. Dworkin rejects the
notion that individualism and personal autonomy should be the guiding principles of bioethical
discussions. See Dworkin, supra note 134, at 736:
The American style of discussing rights is so deviant from that of other western
democracies that Professor Mary Ann Glendon refers to it as a “dialect” and suggests
that it “is turning American political discourse into a parody of itself.” Our focus on
the individual and his rights increases conflict and impedes the search for common
ground. It ignores responsibility, without which rights become license, and it ignores
our interdependence.
(quoting MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 171 (1991)) (footnotes omitted).
146. Professor Stanley Hauerwas, a Christian ethicist at Duke Divinity School, suggests that
the question of whether a fetus is a human person is not the central concern in another visceral
contemporary debate, abortion. See Hauerwas, supra note 143, at 816:
[T]he issues surrounding whether an abortion should or should not be done seldom
turn on the question of the status of the fetus. Rather, they involve why the mother
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Reframing the IVF debate in the context of teleology—in terms
of relationships—also prevents an inappropriate “reduction” of the
preembryo to an object of exchange, or a unit of reproductive success
147
or failure. Noted bioethicist and law professor Michael Shapiro
argues that biomedical technologies ought to be evaluated based on
148
the likelihood that they will erode “noncontingent bonds.” For
Professor Shapiro, these noncontingent bonds are the affections and
duties implicit in the typical parent-child relationship.149
Both traditional and contemporary theology posit a sharp divide
between the teleology of the sacred and the secular spheres.150 Several
theologians writing in the early centuries developed notions of
community through the language of teleology. Writing in the early
centuries of the Christian tradition, Saint Augustine distinguished the
“earthly city” from the “city of God” by describing the earthly city as
one in which the telos of self-love reigned and the individual was
insulated from the rest of the community, and the city of God as one
characterized by the love of God and neighbor.151 Later, Thomas
Aquinas buttressed Augustine’s notion of a common good by framing
the concept of justice around the “mutuality or reciprocity shared
among . . . members of society.”152 Notably, for both Augustine and
Aquinas, respect for the community was not philosophically at odds
with respect for the individual.153 Rather, as Professor Robert Araujo
notes: “[P]rotection of the human person in all of his or her dignity
requires insertion and participation in, not insulation and separation
from, the community. The community . . . withers when [its members]
154
turn within and tend only to their private cares.”

does not want the pregnancy to continue, the conditions under which the pregnancy
occurred, [and] the social conditions into which the child would be born. The question
of whether the fetus is or is not a person is almost a theoretical nicety in relation to
the kind of questions that most abortion decisions actually involve.
147. See Michael H. Shapiro, Is Bioethics Broke?: On the Idea of Ethics and Law “Catching
Up” with Technology, 33 IND. L. REV. 17, 119–20 (1999) (describing a form of “reduction” in
which a person’s value “is ascribed to the single trait or traits in question”).
148. Id. at 119.
149. See id. (“‘Bonds’ here refers to the sense of duty and feelings of affection we have for
our children, whatever their traits, and for each other as persons.”).
150. Araujo, supra note 137, at 735–36.
151. Id. at 736.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 736–37.
154. Id. at 741.
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What these theological perspectives suggest, therefore, is that a
communitarian framework need not come at the expense of
individual choice. Adopting a teleological framework to assess IVF
cryopreservation may prevent courts from falling into the common
fallacy of viewing autonomy and community as mutually exclusive
155
ideals.
C. Policy Implications
The practical effect of applying a teleological framework for
contract law is the enforcement of those contracts that are
philosophically consistent with the telos of the foundational IVF
contract: developing some type of parent-child relationship, biological
or not. Under that framework, because the telos implicates every
preembryo, courts would need to reevaluate contract clauses allowing
for the destruction of remaining preembryos.
There currently exist several alternatives to preembryo
destruction that could be incorporated as contractual options,
156
including preembryo adoption and limitations on the transfer of
157
more preembryos than necessary in a given IVF cycle. Donating
embryos for adoption is consistent with the end for which parties
initially engage in the IVF process: creating a parent-child
relationship.158 Likewise, limiting the number of preembryos
transferred for fertilization during the IVF process is consistent with
IVF’s teleological aim because parties would not be transferring
several more preembryos than they would be willing to parent. Such
limits would provide the dual benefits of avoiding the problem of
remaining preembryos (not all of which, presumably, the IVF parties

155. See Michael H. Shapiro, Illicit Reasons and Means for Reproduction: On Excessive
Choice and Categorical and Technological Imperatives, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1081, 1218 (1996)
(“[T]his view that the framework of choice excludes other frameworks is simply wrong, when
stated as an across-the-board proposition.”).
156. See Batsedis, supra note 15, at 569 (“[F]rozen embryos can now be adopted by
others . . . . [I]f the embryos survive the thawing process, and if the implantation is successful, a
woman will give birth to a child she adopted as an embryo.”).
157. See Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated
Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 624–25 (2003) (observing that some researchers
have recommended that IVF clinics only transfer one or two preembryos for fertilization
purposes).
158. Significantly, there is no genetic “bias” in preembryo adoption. Rather, the adoptive
parents retain full legal rights over their adopted children. See Batsedis, supra note 15, at 570
(noting that Snowflakes, an embryo adoption agency, requires that parties sign a contract
indicating that no legal ties would remain between the biological parents and their embryo).
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would want to parent) and reducing the risk of multifetal pregnancy
159
as well. The approach of limiting the number of transferred
160
preembryos is one that can be legislated as well. However, fewer
embryos transferred may mean lower fertility rates, which is
problematic for clinics.161 That concern notwithstanding, that other
countries (such as the United Kingdom) have successfully legislated
162
such limits on the number of transferred preembryos demonstrates
that practicable alternatives exist that comport with a teleological
approach.
CONCLUSION
With the development of assisted reproductive technologies such
as in vitro fertilization, human inventiveness opened a Pandora’s box
of bioethical and legal issues. In particular, profound uncertainty
exists when a party to IVF subsequently contests the disposition of
cryopreserved preembryos. Perhaps because these technologies
implicate some of the most intimate human concerns—reproduction,
parenting, and marriage—both legislatures and the courts have been
reluctant to speak explicitly about any resolution of the present
confusion. The few courts to address the issue of remaining
preembryos have considered the problem within the typical
framework of contract interpretation, focusing almost exclusively
upon the ideal of individual autonomy. Despite agreement on a
contractual approach to this problem, courts have reached conflicting
results. Some state courts have argued that written IVF agreements
should always be enforced,163 other courts have refused to enforce
agreements against public policy,164 and still other courts have

159. Because of the risk of multifetal pregnancies generated by current multiple preembryo
implantations, some scholars suggest a restriction on the number of preembryos transferred for
fertilization. See, e.g., Carson Strong, Too Many Twins, Triplets, Quadruplets, and So On: A Call
for New Priorities, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 272, 275 (2003) (“In IVF, the risk of multifetal
pregnancy can be reduced by transferring fewer preembryos, but . . . . reducing the number of
preembryos lowers the chances that pregnancy will occur.”).
160. Noah, supra note 157, at 625.
161. See Strong, supra note 159, at 275 (“Clinic-specific pregnancy rates are required by law
to be reported and are published annually. . . . Infertility specialists thus have a personal interest
in achieving high pregnancy rates.”).
162. See Noah, supra note 157, at 625 n.94 (noting that several countries prohibit the
transfer of more than three embryos, and that the United Kingdom recently lowered its limit to
two).
163. See supra Part II.B.
164. See supra Part II.C.
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indicated that agreements are enforceable only if the parties remain
165
in agreement regarding the contract. Ultimately, case law is not a
positive source of guidance on the issue of preembryo disposition.
This Note aims to illustrate how an honest consideration of the
bioethical issues at stake in the IVF process can illuminate a more
productive framework for legal analysis. In particular, the telos of the
IVF process—the development of a parent-child relationship—
militates against a classical, autonomy-oriented contractual approach.
This alternative approach, however, does not necessitate falling into
the typical camps in the debate over reproductive technologies:
people who view preembryos as persons and people who view
preembryos as merely collections of cells. Indeed, as bioethicists now
suggest, attempting to define the ontological status of the preembryo
may ultimately be a losing cause. Rather than ontology, this Note
argues for teleology as the guiding bioethical principle to resolve this
legal debate.

165.

See supra Part II.D.

